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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 This case is before us on remand from the United 
States Supreme Court.  Appellants Keith Litman and Robert 
Wachtel had earlier asked us to reverse an order of the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey 
compelling them to arbitrate their contract dispute with 
Cellco Partnership d/b/a Verizon Wireless (“Verizon”) on an 
individual rather than a class-wide basis.  In an unpublished 
opinion and order filed May 21, 2010, we vacated the District 
Court‟s order because a recent precedent of ours bound us to 
conclude that class arbitration should have been available to 
the appellants.  Litman v. Cellco P’ship, 381 F. App‟x 140 
(3d Cir. 2010) (citing Homa v. American Express Co., 558 
F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2009)).  Verizon responded to our ruling by 
seeking a stay of our mandate and filing a petition for a writ 
of certiorari, both of which were granted.  The Supreme 
Court, shortly after issuing its opinion in AT&T Mobility v. 
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011), vacated our decision and 
remanded the case to us for further consideration.  Cellco 
P’ship v. Litman, 131 S. Ct. 2872 (2011) (table).  On remand, 
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we asked for supplemental briefing to gain the parties‟ 
perspectives on how Concepcion applies to this case.  Having 
now reviewed the supplemental briefing and Concepcion, we 
conclude that the New Jersey law at issue, which 
“[r]equire[es] the availability of classwide arbitration ...[,] 
creates a scheme inconsistent with the [Federal Arbitration 
Act].”  Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1748.  Accordingly, we will 
affirm the District Court‟s order compelling individual 
arbitration in accordance with the terms of Litman‟s and 




 Verizon provides wireless telephone service to 
millions of customers nationwide.  Litman and Wachtel were 
among that number.  They each entered into a Customer 
Agreement (the “Agreements”) pursuant to which Verizon 
supplied them cell phone service for a fixed monthly price.   
 
Beginning on or about September 30, 2005, Verizon 
allegedly began to impose on its fixed-price customers a 
“bogus, unlawful, and inequitable” monthly administrative 
charge of forty cents.  (App. at 26-27.)  Later, in March 2007, 
it allegedly charged fixed- price customers an improper 
seventy-cent administrative charge.  According to Litman and 
Wachtel, the added charges amounted to a “unilateral price 
increase for all of its customers,” in violation of Verizon‟s 
contractual obligation to provide cell phone service at a fixed 
price.  (App. at 27, 35-37.)  On that theory, Litman and 
Wachtel filed this putative class action.   
 
The complaint asserts three claims: breach of contract, 
unjust enrichment, and violations of the New Jersey 
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Consumer Fraud Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-1, et seq.  
Verizon moved to compel individual arbitration pursuant to 
the following clause in the Agreements:
1
   
 
WE EACH AGREE TO SETTLE DISPUTES 
… ONLY BY ARBITRATION … 
* * * 
(1)   THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT 
APPLIES TO THIS AGREEMENT … ANY 
CONTROVERSY OR CLAIM ARISING OUT 
OF OR RELATING TO THIS AGREEMENT, 
OR ANY PRIOR AGREEMENT FOR 
WIRELESS SERVICE WITH [VERIZON] … 
WILL BE SETTLED BY ONE OR MORE 
NEUTRAL ARBITRATORS BEFORE THE 
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION 
(“AAA”) OR BETTER BUSINESS BUREAU 
(“BBB”). 
* * * 
(3) … THIS AGREEMENT DOESN‟T 
PERMIT CLASS ARBITRATIONS EVEN IF 
TH[E] PROCEDURES [OF THE AAA OR 
BBB] WOULD.  
* * * 
                                                          
1
 Litman‟s relationship with Verizon was governed by 
a November 2006 Agreement and Wachtel‟s by a September 
2007 Agreement.  The arbitration clause in each is identical.  
  6 
(6) IF FOR SOME REASON THE 
PROHIBITION ON CLASS ARBITRATIONS 
SET FORTH IN SUBSECTION (3) … IS 
DEEMED UNENFORCEABLE, THEN THE 
AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE WILL NOT 
APPLY.  FURTHER, IF FOR ANY REASON 
A CLAIM PROCEEDS IN COURT RATHER 
THAN THROUGH ARBITRATION, WE 
EACH WAIVE ANY TRIAL BY JURY. 
 (App. at 54-55, 71-72.)   
 
 Litman and Wachtel opposed Verizon‟s motion to 
compel individual arbitration, arguing that, pursuant to the 
New Jersey Supreme Court‟s decision in Muhammad v. 
County Bank of Rehoboth Beach, Delaware, 912 A.2d 88, 
100 (N.J. 2006), the Agreements‟ arbitration clause – 
specifically its class-arbitration waiver – was unconscionable 
and therefore unenforceable under New Jersey law.
2
  For 
                                                          
2
 In Muhammad, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
examined a class arbitration waiver in a consumer contract of 
adhesion, specifically a payday loan agreement, and held that 
that waiver was unconscionable, and as such unenforceable, 
because it deprived “Muhammad of the mechanism of a class-
wide action, whether in arbitration or in court litigation.”  912 
A.2d at 101.  In reaching its holding, the Muhammad Court 
considered the “public interests affected by the contract.”  Id. 
at 99.  It noted that, “when … found in a consumer contract of 
adhesion in a setting in which disputes between the 
contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of 
damages,” class waivers are problematic since “„rational‟ 
consumers may decline to pursue individual consumer-fraud 
lawsuits because it may not be worth the time spent 
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purposes of its motion, Verizon did not challenge the 
applicability of Muhammad, but instead argued that the 
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) preempted Muhammad.  
The District Court accepted that argument.  Relying on our 
decision in Gay v. CreditInform, 511 F.3d 369 (3d Cir. 2007), 
which stated that Pennsylvania court decisions declaring 
class-wide arbitration waivers unconscionable were 
preempted by the FAA,
3
 the District Court held that the class 
                                                                                                                                  
prosecuting the suit, even if competent counsel was willing to 
take the case.”  Id. (emphasis original).  Thus, the court 
opined, such class action waivers “functionally exculpate 
wrongful conduct.”  Id. at 100.  As a result, the waivers 
compromise “[t]he public interest at stake in … consumers 
effectively … pursu[ing] their statutory rights under [New 
Jersey‟s] consumer protection laws,” and that interest, the 
court concluded, “overrides … enforcement of the class-
arbitration bar in th[e] agreement[s].”  Id. at 101.    
3
 More precisely, Gay reviewed two Pennsylvania 
Superior Court cases, Lytle v. CitiFinancial Services, Inc., 
810 A.2d 643 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002), and Thibodeau v. 
Comcast Corp., 912 A.2d 874 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006).  Lytle 
indicated that a class arbitration waiver would be problematic 
in small-stakes cases.  See 810 A.2d at 666 (saying “the 
record before us is devoid of any evidence that would 
establish that the damages claimed by appellants are 
insufficient to permit the Lytles to seek legal redress for their 
injuries in the absence of a class action[,]” but going on to 
hold that “upon remand, the trial court ... may also receive 
and consider evidence relevant to the Lytles‟ argument that 
the costs associated with individual versus class-based 
litigation of their claim ... would, in light of the amount of 
their damages, result in continuing immunity for [defendant] 
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arbitration waiver at issue here is valid.  The Court thus 
granted Verizon‟s motion to compel individual arbitration and 
dismissed the case.  Litman and Wachtel timely appealed.  
 
 After the opening and answering briefs had been 
submitted, we decided Homa v. American Express Co., 558 
F.3d 225 (3d Cir. 2009), in which we specifically addressed 
whether the conclusion expressed by the New Jersey Supreme 
Court in Muhammad was preempted by the FAA.  We held 
that it was not preempted, and we distinguished our earlier 
decision in Gay by noting that the Pennsylvania cases 
considered there, “„though … written ostensibly to apply 
general principles of contract law, … hold that an agreement 
to arbitrate may be unconscionable simply because it is an 
agreement to arbitrate,‟” id. at 229 (quoting Gay, 511 F.3d at 
395), whereas the New Jersey Supreme Court in Muhammad 
was, we thought, at pains to say that a waiver of class-wide 
dispute resolution would be improper in the context of either 
litigation or arbitration.  We thus concluded that Muhammad 
“plainly [did] not hold that an agreement to arbitrate may be 
unconscionable simply because it is an agreement to 
arbitrate.”  Homa, 558 F.3d at 229-30 (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted).  Rather, we said, because 
Muhammad provides a defense against “all waivers of class-
wide actions, not simply those that also compel arbitration,” it 
was not preempted by the FAA.  558 F.3d at 230 (emphasis 
added).   
 
                                                                                                                                  
for its wrongful acts”).  Thibodeau later characterized the 
holding of Lytle as being that “mandatory individual 
arbitration [is] unconscionable when it actually prohibits 
consumer claims.”  912 A.2d at 883. 
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Not surprisingly, Litman and Wachtel moved for 
summary reversal in this case, based on our decision in 
Homa.  We agreed that reversal was required.
4
  See Litman, 
381 F. App‟x at 142.  We recognized that Gay‟s discussion of 
the FAA‟s preemptive effect on Pennsylvania law was only 
dicta.
5
  Id.  In contrast, we noted, Homa was precedent 
                                                          
4
 Before we reached that decision, Verizon moved to 
stay the appeal pending our en banc consideration of Puleo v. 
Chase Bank USA, in which we addressed whether the 
question of arbitrability, specifically the contention that a 
class action waiver was unconscionable and therefore 
unenforceable, was for a court or arbitrator to decide.  605 
F.3d 172, 175 (3d Cir. 2010) (en banc).  In Puleo we 
concluded, among other things, “that when a contractual party 
challenges the validity of an arbitration agreement by 
contending that one or more of its terms is unconscionable 
and unenforceable, a question of arbitrability is presented,” 
which is “a gateway matter for judicial determination.”  Id. at 
180.  We explained that a challenge to a class arbitration ban 
“necessarily calls into question the very authority of the 
arbitrator to preside over the dispute, and, by extension, the 
validity of the [arbitration agreement] itself” which 
necessarily makes it a question “for the court to resolve.”  Id. 
at 183.   
 
5
 That discussion was dicta because “our holding in 
Gay was that Virginia law governed the parties‟ arbitration 
agreement.”  Puleo, 605 F.3d at 177 n.2 (citing Gay, 511 F.3d 
at 390).  In our earlier opinion in this case, we noted that, 
even if the commentary about preemption were the holding of 
Gay, it could still be reconciled with Homa.  Litman, 381 F. 
App‟x at 142-43.  We reasoned that, under Pennsylvania case 
law, “„an agreement to arbitrate may be unconscionable 
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“directly on point and binding on us,” so we were required to 
“conclude[] that the FAA does not preempt Muhammad.”  Id. 
at 143.  Accordingly, we vacated the District Court‟s order 
compelling individual arbitration and remanded the case for 
further proceedings, which might have involved some class-
wide dispute resolution.  Id. 
 
 Verizon filed a motion to stay our mandate pending the 
filing of a petition for writ of certiorari.  We allowed the stay, 
and Verizon filed its petition.  On May 2, 2011, the Supreme 
Court granted Verizon‟s petition, vacated our May 2010 
opinion and order, and remanded the case for our review in 
light of its newly issued opinion in AT&T Mobility v. 
Concepcion.  See Cellco P’ship, 131 S. Ct. at 2872.    
 
                                                                                                                                  
simply because it is an agreement to arbitrate,‟” id. at 142 
(quoting Gay, 511 F.3d at 395), whereas the holding in Homa 
rested on the conclusion that, in invalidating the class-
arbitration waiver, Muhammad applied general principles of 
contract and, importantly, “did not evince hostility toward 
arbitration clauses” in general, id. at 143 (citing Homa, 558 
F.3d at 230, and Puleo, 605 F.3d at 177 n.2 (“[T]he New 
Jersey case law at issue in Homa did not evince hostility 
toward arbitration clauses, which was the concern about 
Pennsylvania law expressed in Gay.”)). 
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II. Discussion6 
 
The specific question before us remains whether the 
FAA preempts the New Jersey Supreme Court‟s ruling in 
Muhammad.  As noted above, we had previously held that, 
pursuant to Homa, it did not.  We now examine that decision 
anew and hold that Homa has been abrogated by Concepcion 
and that Muhammad is preempted by the FAA.  
 
Section 2 of the FAA, the “primary substantive 
provision of the Act,” Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. 
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983), provides that 
 
[a] written provision in any … contract 
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to 
settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter 
arising out of such contract or transaction … 
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, 
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract. 
9 U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis added.)  Thus, consistent with § 2, 
“generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, 
or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration 
agreements.”  Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 
681, 687 (1996).  In considering an arbitration agreement, we 
                                                          
6
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1332(d).  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 9 U.S.C. 
§ 16(a)(3).  “We exercise plenary review over [a] District 
Court‟s decision to compel arbitration.”  Trippe Mfg. Co. v. 
Niles Audio Corp., 401 F.3d 529, 531 (3d Cir. 2005). 
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may use the law “of the involved state or territory” as an 
interpretive guide, Gay, 511 F.3d at 388, but the “liberal 
federal policy favoring arbitration,” Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. 
at 24, which gave birth to the FAA, requires that “arbitration 
agreements [be] on an equal footing with other contracts and 
[that they be] enforce[d] … according to their terms,” 
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745 (internal citations omitted).   
 
As is obvious from our decisions in Gay and Homa, 
this case is not our first effort to reconcile waivers of class 
arbitration with state court decisions reflecting public policies 
against such waivers.  In our initial ruling in this case, we 
discussed the tension between Gay and Homa and decided we 
had to follow Homa, since it addressed precisely the question 
at issue here, namely whether New Jersey‟s Muhammad 
decision forbidding class arbitration waivers could withstand 
the preemptive sweep of the FAA.  “We are bound by 
precedential opinions of our Court[,]” we observed, “unless 
they have been reversed by an en banc proceeding or have 
been adversely affected by an opinion of the Supreme Court.”  
Litman, 381 F. App‟x at 143 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).   
 
The Supreme Court‟s more recent opinion in 
Concepcion works just such a change in the law.  The Court 
addressed “whether the FAA prohibits States from 
conditioning the enforceability of certain arbitration 
agreements on the availability of classwide arbitration 
procedures.”  131 S. Ct. at 1744.  The Concepcions had 
purchased AT&T cell phone service, which was advertised to 
include free phones.  Id. at 1744.  They were charged sales 
tax on the phones and, believing that to be inconsistent with 
the promise that the phones were “free,” they brought a 
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putative class action against AT&T.  Id.  AT&T moved to 
compel arbitration under the terms of its contract with the 
Concepcions, which “provided for arbitration of all disputes 
between the parties, but required that claims be brought in the 
parties‟ individual capacity, and not as a plaintiff or class 
member in any purported class or representative proceeding.”  
Id. at 1744 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
The district court ruled that, pursuant to the California 
Supreme Court‟s decision in Discover Bank v. Superior 
Court, 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005),
7
 the governing contract‟s 
arbitration provision was unconscionable.  Concepcion, 131 
S. Ct. at 1745.  AT&T appealed, but the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the 
Discover Bank rule was not preempted by the FAA because it 
was simply “a refinement of the unconscionability analysis 
applicable to contracts generally.”  Id.  The Supreme Court 
saw it differently.      
 
In dispatching the reasoning and rule of Discover 
Bank, the Supreme Court stated that the clause in § 2 of the 
FAA that requires enforcement of an arbitration agreement 
“save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract[,]” does not “preserve state-law 
                                                          
7
 Like the New Jersey Supreme Court‟s decision in 
Muhammad, the California Supreme Court held in Discover 
Bank that class arbitration waivers in consumer adhesion 
contracts are unconscionable and contrary to public policy 
when the “disputes between the contracting parties 
predictably involve small amounts of damages, and when it is 
alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has 
… deliberately cheat[ed] large numbers of consumers out of 
individually small sums of money.”  113 P.3d at 1110.   
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rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the 
FAA‟s objectives.”  Id. at 1748.  In the Court‟s view, 
“[r]equiring the availability of classwide arbitration interferes 
with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a 
scheme inconsistent with the FAA.”  Id.  More specifically, 
the Court held that requiring the availability of class action 
mechanisms undermines the “principal purpose of the FAA[, 
which] is to ensure that private arbitration agreements are 
enforced according to their terms.”  Id. (internal quotation 
marks and brackets omitted).  Further, the Court determined 
that the FAA‟s objective of “affording parties discretion in 
designing arbitration processes … to allow for efficient, 
streamlined[,]” tailored mechanisms to address a dispute, id. 
at 1749, is compromised by state rules “[r]equiring the 
availability of classwide arbitration,” id. at 1748.  The Court 
reasoned that “the switch from bilateral to class arbitration 
sacrifices the principal advantage of arbitration – its 
informality – and makes the process slower, more costly, and 
more likely to generate procedural morass than final 
judgment,” id. at 1751, not to mention that it increases the 
“risks to defendants,” id. at 1752.  Accordingly, the Supreme 
Court held that California‟s Discovery Bank rule stood “as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full 
purposes and objectives of Congress … [and was] preempted 
by the FAA.”  Id. at 1753 (internal citations and quotation 
marks omitted).   
 
We understand the holding of Concepcion to be both 
broad and clear: a state law that seeks to impose class 
arbitration despite a contractual agreement for individualized 
arbitration is inconsistent with, and therefore preempted by, 
the FAA, irrespective of whether class arbitration “is 
desirable for unrelated reasons.”  Id. at 1753.  Therefore, we 
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must hold that, contrary to our earlier decisions in Homa and 
in this case, the rule established by the New Jersey Supreme 
Court in Muhammad is preempted by the FAA.  It follows 
that the arbitration clause at issue here must be enforced 
according to its terms, which requires individual arbitration 
and forecloses class arbitration.
8
   
                                                          
8
 Litman and Wachtel make two arguments against this 
outcome, neither of which is compelling.  First, they posit that 
their Agreements with Verizon stipulate that New Jersey law 
– most significantly Muhammad – applies, not federal law.  
(Appellant Supp. Br. at 1.)  The Agreements‟ choice of law 
provision reads that, “[e]xcept to the extent we‟ve agreed 
otherwise in the provision[] on … arbitration, or as required 
by Federal law” disputes are to be “governed by the laws of 
the state encompassing the area code assigned to [Litman and 
Wachtel‟s] phone number[s] when [Litman and Wachtel] 
accepted th[e] agreement[s].”  (App. at 55, 72.)  The 
arbitration provision reads that the FAA applies to the 
Agreements (App. at 72) and, independent of that, the FAA 
governs the duty to honor arbitration agreements.  See 9 
U.S.C. §§ 1, et seq.; Invista S.À.R.L. v. Rhodia, S.A., 625 
F.3d 75, 83 (3d. Cir. 2010) (“The Federal Arbitration Act … 
creates a body of federal substantive law establishing and 
governing the duty to honor agreements to arbitrate disputes.” 
(internal citation and quotation marks omitted)).  Thus, New 
Jersey law applies only to the extent it is consistent with the 
FAA, making Litman and Wachtel‟s first argument baseless.  
Second, Litman and Wachtel argue that they should be 
allowed to proceed to litigation because the Agreements‟ say 
that “if for some reason the prohibition on class arbitrations 
… is deemed unenforceable, then the agreement to arbitrate 
will not apply.”  (App. at 55, 72.)  As Litman and Wachtel see 




Because the United States Supreme Court‟s decision in 
Concepcion holds that state law “[r]equiring the availability 
of classwide arbitration … is inconsistent with the FAA[,]” 
131 S. Ct. at 1748, we now endorse the District Court‟s 
decision to reject New Jersey law holding that waivers of 
class arbitration are unconscionable, and we will affirm the 
District Court‟s order compelling individual arbitration of the 
appellants‟ claims.      
                                                                                                                                  
it, that provision was triggered by Muhammad.  However, 
because Muhammad is preempted by the FAA, it is 
inapplicable here and cannot trigger that provision.     
